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DATA-INFORMED DUTIES IN AI DEVELOPMENT 
Frank Pasquale * 
Law should help direct—and not merely constrain—the develop-
ment of artificial intelligence (AI). One path to influence is the develop-
ment of standards of care both supplemented and informed by rigorous 
regulatory guidance. Such standards are particularly important given 
the potential for inaccurate and inappropriate data to contaminate ma-
chine learning. Firms relying on faulty data can be required to compen-
sate those harmed by that data use—and should be subject to punitive 
damages when such use is repeated or willful. Regulatory standards for 
data collection, analysis, use, and stewardship can inform and comple-
ment generalist judges. Such regulation will not only provide guidance 
to industry to help it avoid preventable accidents. It will also assist a 
judiciary that is increasingly called upon to develop common law in re-
sponse to legal disputes arising out of the deployment of AI. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporations will increasingly attempt to substitute artificial intelli-
gence (AI) and robotics for human labor.1 This evolution will create 
novel situations for tort law to address. However, tort will only be one of 
several types of law at play in the deployment of AI. Regulators will try to 
forestall problems by developing licensing regimes and product stand-
ards. Corporate lawyers will attempt to deflect liability via contractual 
arrangements.2 The interplay of tort, contract, and regulation will not 
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 1. See, e.g., James Manyika, Susan Lund, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan 
Woetzel, Parul Batra, Ryan Ko & Saurabh Sanghvi, McKinsey & Co., Jobs Lost, Jobs 
Gained: What the Future of Work Will Mean for Jobs, Skills, and Wages 1 (2017),  https:// 
www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Future%20of%20Organizations
/What%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20for%20jobs%20skills%20and
%20wages/MGI-Jobs-Lost-Jobs-Gained-Report-December-6-2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/ 
XCF4-JJPC].(describing the far-reaching impact that automation will have on the global 
workforce). 
 2. This is already a common practice in the digital economy. See, e.g., Timothy J. 
Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation on Liability Clauses: A 
Perfect Storm?, 11 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 163, 173 (2012) (describing a proliferation of 
limitation of liability clauses); Aaron T. Chiu, Note, Irrationally Bound: Terms of Use 
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just allocate responsibility ex post, spreading the costs of accidents 
among those developing and deploying AI, their insurers, and those they 
harm. This matrix of legal rules will also deeply influence the develop-
ment of AI, including the industrial organization of firms, and capital’s 
and labor’s relative share of productivity and knowledge gains. 
Despite these ongoing efforts to anticipate the risks of innovation, 
there is grave danger that AI will become one more tool for deflecting 
liability, like the shell companies that now obscure and absorb the blame 
for much commercial malfeasance.3 The perfect technology of 
irresponsible profit would be a robot capable of earning funds for a firm, 
while taking on the regulatory, compliance, and legal burden tradition-
ally shouldered by the firm itself. Any proposal to grant AI “personhood” 
should be considered in this light.4 Moreover, both judges and regulators 
should begin to draw red lines of responsibility and attribution now, 
while the technology is still nascent.5 
                                                                                                                           
Licenses and the Breakdown of Consumer Rationality in the Market for Social Network 
Sites, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 167, 195 (2011) (describing the use of “disclaimers of liabil-
ity” in social media network use agreements). For a practical example of how contracts are 
used to deflect, allocate, or redirect liability in the construction industry, see generally 
Patricia D. Galloway, The Art of Allocating Risk in an EPC Contract to Minimize Disputes, 
Construction Law., Fall 2018, at 26 (discussing risk allocation in engineering, procure-
ment, and construction (EPC) contracts). In the health care context, “hold harmless” 
clauses can deflect liability from software providers. See Ross Koppel, Uses of the Legal 
System that Attenuate Patient Safety, 68 DePaul L. Rev. 273, 275−76 (“The ‘hold harmless’ 
clause in EHR [Electronic Health Record] contracts functions to prevent vendors from 
being held responsible for errors in their software even if the vendor has been repeatedly 
informed of the problem and even if the problem causes harm or death to patients.”). 
 3. As leading AI ethics expert Joanna Bryson has explained: 
Many of the problems we have in the world today come from people try-
ing to evade the accountability of democracies and regulatory bodies. 
And AI would be the ultimate shell company. If AI is human-like, the ar-
gument goes, then you can use human justice on it. But that’s just false. 
You can’t even use human justice against shell companies. And there’s 
no way to build AI that can actually care about avoiding corruption or 
obeying the law. So it would be a complete mistake—a huge legal, moral 
and political hazard—to grant rights to AI. 
Fraser Myers, AI: Inhuman After All?, Spiked-Online (June 14, 2019),  https://www.spiked-
online.com/2019/06/14/ai-inhuman-after-all/ [https://perma.cc/A26G-YEX4] (conducting 
an interview with Bryson). 
 4. See Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant, Of, for, and by 
the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 Artificial Intelligence & L. 273, 273 
(2017) (“We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing sali-
ent precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that 
difficulties in holding ‘electronic persons’ accountable when they violate the rights of 
others outweigh the . . . moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.”). 
 5. Some may argue it is already too late, thanks to the power of leading firms in the 
AI space. However, there have been many recent efforts to understand and curb the worst 
effects of such firms. The U.S. government has demonstrated an interest in keeping large 
tech companies in line. For example, Facebook is currently facing a $5 billion fine from 
the FTC, a $100 million fine from the SEC, and an FTC antitrust investigation. Ian Sherr, 
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It may seem difficult to draw such red lines, because both journalists 
and technologists can present AI as a technological development that 
exceeds the control or understanding of those developing it.6 However, 
the suite of statistical methods at the core of technologies now hailed as 
AI has undergone evolution, not revolution.7 Large new sources of data 
have enhanced its scope of application, as well as technologists’ ambi-
tions.8 But the same types of doctrines applied to computational sensing, 
prediction, and actuation in the past can also inform the near future of 
AI advance.9 
A company deploying AI can fail in many of the same ways as a firm 
using older, less avant-garde machines or software. This Essay focuses on 
one particular type of failing that can lead to harm: the use of inaccurate 
or inappropriate data in training sets for machine learning. Firms using 
faulty data can be required to compensate those harmed by that data 
use—and should be subject to punitive damages when such faulty data 
                                                                                                                           
Facebook’s $5 Billion FTC Fine Is Just the Start of Its Problems, CNET (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebooks-5-billion-ftc-fine-is-just-the-start-of-its-problems/ 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Department of Justice is also reviewing tech 
companies for antitrust issues. Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open Broad, New 
Antitrust Review of Big Tech Companies, Wall St. J. (July 23, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/justice-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-big-tech-companies-
11563914235 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In response, tech companies, such as 
Facebook and Google, have expanded their lobbying capacity. See Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. 
Vogel, Tech Giants Amass a Lobbying Army for an Epic Washington Battle, N.Y. Times (June 5, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/us/politics/amazon- 
apple-facebook-google-lobbying.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 6. See, e.g., Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT Tech. Rev. (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ 
[https://perma.cc/V3LF-KBLD] (describing Nvidia’s experimental autonomous car as 
having a “mysterious mind” unable to be understood by those designing it); David 
Weinberger, Our Machines Now Have Knowledge We’ll Never Understand, WIRED (Apr. 
18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/our-machines-now-have-knowledge-well-never-
understand/ [https://perma.cc/FW94-L2BE] (“This infusion of alien intelligence is 
bringing into question the assumptions embedded in our long Western tradition.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Best Practice AI, Evolution, Not Revolution: What the Bestpractice.ai Library 
Tells Us About the State of AI (Part 1), Medium (Sept. 17, 2018), https://medium.com/ 
@bestpracticeAI/evolution-not-revolution-what-the-bestpractice-ai-library-tells-us-about-
the-state-of-ai-part-1-f488b29add0b [https://perma.cc/VB86-544K] (describing findings 
from the development of Bestpractice.ai, a library of AI use cases and case studies). 
 8. See generally Yoav Shoham, Raymond Perrault, Erik Brynjolfsson, Jack Clark, 
James Manyika, Juan Carlos Niebles, Terah Lyons, John Etchemendy, Barbara Grosz & Zoe 
Bauer, Artificial Intelligence Index: 2018 Annual Report (2018),  http://cdn.aiindex.org/2018/ 
AI%20Index%202018%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PWE-B7Z8] (presenting 
data suggesting that the number of patents and academic papers involving AI, among other 
metrics, have grown rapidly). 
 9. Notable recent U.S. work in this vein includes Bryan Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 
Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327673 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that extant forms of liability should apply 
to robotics and thus many of the forms of AI that comprise the information processing of 
such robotics and can address many of the problems posed by such technology). 
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collection, analysis, and use is repeated or willful. Skeptics may worry that 
judges and juries are ill-equipped to make determinations about appro-
priate data collection, analysis, and use. However, they need not act 
alone—regulation of data collection, analysis, and use already exists in 
other contexts.10 Such regulation not only provides guidance to industry 
to help it avoid preventable accidents and other torts. It also assists 
judges assessing standards of care for the deployment of emerging tech-
nologies. The interplay of federal regulation of health data with state tort 
suits for breach of confidentiality is instructive here: Egregious failures by 
firms can not only spark tort liability but also catalyze commitments to 
regulation to prevent the problems that sparked that liability, which in 
turn should promote progress toward higher standards of care.11 
Preserving the complementarity of tort law and regulation in this 
way (rather than opting to radically diminish the role of either of these 
modalities of social order, as premature preemption or deregulation 
might do) is wise for several reasons. First, this hybrid model expands 
opportunities for those harmed by new technologies to demand account-
ability.12 Second, the political economy of automation will only fairly dis-
tribute expertise and power if law and policy create ongoing incentives 
for individuals to both understand and control the AI supply chain and 
AI’s implementation. Judges, lawmakers, and advocates must avoid 
developing legal and regulatory systems that merely deflect responsibility, 
rather than cultivate it, lest large firms exploit well-established power im-
balances to burden consumers and workers with predictable harms aris-
ing out of faulty data. 
I. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INACCURATE AND INAPPROPRIATE DATA 
At its best, tort law rectifies wrongs (retrospectively) and enables per-
sons to better plan their lives (prospectively).13 This Part discusses some 
classic wrongs addressed by tort law and how the rise of AI, including the 
rhetoric surrounding it, may unnecessarily complicate adjudication aris-
ing out of them. To clarify some critical issues of duty and causation, liti-
gants and courts should begin to focus on questions of inaccurate and 
inappropriate data, given the importance of data to the development of 
AI. 
The duties of care prescribed by tort are reassuring aspects of a just 
social order. If a person is injured in a car accident by a negligent driver, 
courts should ensure some compensatory (and potentially punitive) dam-
ages payable by the tortfeasor (or their insurer) to ensure, as well as 
                                                                                                                           
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 137, 143 (1995) 
(“The liability system supplements regulation.”). 
 13. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4–5, 47–48 (1st ed. 
1988). 
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possible, that the plaintiff is returned to the state of financial and physi-
cal health they would have enjoyed before the accident.14 In the medical 
context, malpractice law is designed to give patients reassurance that if 
their physician falls below a standard of care, a penalty will be imposed 
and some portion of it dedicated to the recovery of the patient.15 
The machines used by drivers and doctors are also subject to forms 
of tort liability: for example, in case they are negligently manufactured or 
defective by design.16 These doctrines should have renewed relevance as 
new technologies of diagnosis and prediction arise in both general and 
specialty medical care. While AI applications promise many advances, 
they also create new risks.  
Consider the rise of clinical decision support software for derma-
tologists. As the Atlantic recently reported, “A study that tested machine-
learning software in dermatology, conducted by a group of researchers 
primarily out of Germany, found that ‘deep-learning convolutional neu-
ral networks,’ or CNN, detected potentially cancerous skin lesions better 
than the 58 dermatologists included in the study group.”17 To the extent 
such AI is continually validated, it may well become part of the standard 
of care for many tasks now performed by physicians.18 However, the mere 
fact that a technology is better in general does not mean that it is optimal 
for all cases. In the case of facial recognition, there is a well-documented 
failure of AI systems to recognize the faces of persons of color, relative to 
its ability to recognize white persons’ faces.19 Many scholars have raised 
similar concerns with respect to racial disparities in health care in the 
                                                                                                                           
 14. Cf. Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, Alfred W. Gans & Monique C. M. Leahy, 
American Law of Torts § 8:1 (Mar. 2019 Update) (describing the types of redress available 
to plaintiffs in a tort action). 
 15. Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1201, 1203, 
1209 (2012) (“Under the prevalent doctrine, a doctor commits malpractice when he treats 
a patient in a way that deviates from the norms established by the medical profession. The 
applicable norms flow from the accepted, or customary, medical practice: the ways in 
which similarly situated medical practitioners treat patients.”). I introduce the topic with 
examples from transport and health in part because these fields are among the most af-
fected, or likely to be affected, by advances in AI. 
 16. See, e.g., Adams v. Toyota Motor Corp., 867 F.3d 903, 917 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that the evidence supported a jury verdict finding the manufacturer liable for 
deaths and injuries of persons involved in the collision in family members’ products liabil-
ity action based on a design defect). 
 17. Angela Lashbrook, AI-Driven Dermatology Could Leave Dark-Skinned Patients 
Behind, Atlantic (Aug. 16, 2018),  https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/08/ 
machine-learning-dermatology-skin-color/567619/ [https://perma.cc/NLC2-VCFS]. 
 18. A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 
Ariz. L. Rev. 33, 35, 61–63 (2019). 
 19. See Tim Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces 
Equally, WIRED (July 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-
recognize-black-faces-equally/ [https://perma.cc/QQ4J-XBMB]. 
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United States.20 Physicians and computer scientists are already concerned 
that skin anomaly–detecting software may fail to work for African 
Americans and other minority groups in the United States as well as it 
does for white patients.21 
Such problems are not new. In many cases, AI is little more than a 
better-marketed form of statistics, and consulting statistics has long been 
a part of medical practice.22 AI is but one of many steps taken over the 
past two decades to modernize medicine with a more extensive evidence 
base.23 Commentators have seized on predictive analytics, big data, artifi-
cial intelligence, machine learning, and deep learning as master meta-
phors for optimizing system performance.24 Thus literature on each of 
these areas can illuminate the path forward for identifying problematic 
data in AI. Moreover, an emerging literature on the limits of AI (includ-
ing lack of reproducibility, narrow validity, overblown claims, and opaque 
data) should also inform legal standards.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big 
Business Re-Create Race in the Twenty-First Century 81–103 (2012). See generally Dayna 
Bowen Matthew, Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care 
(2015) (examining racial health disparities through the lens of implicit bias). 
 21. Adewole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care 
Disparities in Dermatology, 154 JAMA Dermatology 1247, 1247 (2018). A cognate problem 
has arisen in genomics. See Eric Topol & Kai Fu Lee, It Takes a Planet, 37 Nature 
Biotechnology 858, 859 (2019) (“AI algorithmic development and validation requires 
diverse and massive datasets. There is little evidence for saturation but plenty of examples 
of misleading outputs when the data inputs are limited or venue specific.”). 
 22. See Meredith Broussard, Artificial Unintelligence: How Computers Misunderstand 
the World 32 (2018) (“Narrow AI is statistics on steroids.”). 
 23. See Inst. of Med. Roundtable on Evidence-Based Medicine, The Learning Healthcare 
System: Workshop Summary 81 (LeighAnne Olsen, Dara Aisner & J. Michael McGinnis eds., 
2007),  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/n/nap11903/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/3VYA-
M3S4] (“An essential component of the learning healthcare system is the capacity to contin-
ually improve approaches to gathering and evaluating evidence, taking advantage of new 
tools and methods.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Martin Ford, Architects of Intelligence 4 (2018) (describing deep learn-
ing); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will 
Transform How We Live, Work, and Think 7 (2013) (“Big data marks the beginning of a 
major transformation.”); Nils J. Nilsson, The Quest for Artificial Intelligence 415 (2010) 
(describing reinforcement learning). 
 25. Eric Topol, Deep Medicine 94 (2019) (citing concerns about “cherry-picking 
results or lack of reproducibility”); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for 
Big Data, 15 Info., Comm. & Soc’y 662, 666–68 (2012) (describing how claims of objectiv-
ity and accuracy in big data can be misleading); Matthew Zook, Solon Barocas, danah 
boyd, Kate Crawford, Emily Keller, Seeta Peña Gangadharan, Alyssa Goodman, Rachelle 
Hollander, Barbara A. Koenig, Jacob Metcalf, Arvind Narayanan, Alondra Nelson & Frank 
Pasquale, Editorial, Ten Simple Rules for Responsible Big Data Research, PLOS 
Computational Biology, Mar. 30, 2017, at 1, 2, https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article/ 
file?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005399&type=printable (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(identifying similar limits). 
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A. Inaccurate Data 
In 2012, law professor Sharona Hoffman and computer scientist 
Andy Podgurski analyzed some common problems in then-emerging uses 
of big data in healthcare.26 A great deal of the data that is now set to in-
form AI applications in healthcare is “generally observational, not experi-
mental, and hence treatments and exposures are not assigned randomly. 
This makes it much more difficult to ensure that causal inferences are 
not distorted by systematic biases.”27 Dr. Dhruv Kullar gives a good exam-
ple of the dangers of these dynamics: 
In medicine, unchecked A.I. could create self-fulfilling 
prophesies that confirm our preexisting biases, especially when 
used for conditions with complex trade-offs and high degrees of 
uncertainty. If, for example, poorer patients do worse after or-
gan transplantation or after receiving chemotherapy for end-
stage cancer, machine learning algorithms may conclude such 
patients are less likely to benefit from further treatment—and 
recommend against it.28 
There are several problems with basing treatment on socioeconomic 
status. A skilled medical practitioner should be interested in why poorer 
patients are doing worse, not simply that they are.29 Perhaps they have a 
harder time accessing follow-up care or healthy food. The proper re-
sponse in that case is not to allow poverty to reduce the priority of a pa-
tient for a transplant. Rather, it is to invest in transportation, nutritional 
advice and subsidies, and other social supports that will promote a more 
                                                                                                                           
 26. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and 
Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Spring Supp.) 56, 56 (2013). 
 27. Id. at 57. 
 28. Dhruv Khullar, Opinion, A.I. Could Worsen Health Disparities, N.Y. Times (Jan. 
31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/opinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). As Judea Pearl and Dana MacKenzie have shown, add-
ing accounts of causation via diagrams and other intuitive explanatory tools can help 
professionals avoid such mistakes. Judea Pearl & Dana MacKenzie, The Book of Why: 
The New Science of Cause and Effect 13, 39–46 (2018). This is one reason why the 
European Union has adopted rules designed to promote explainable AI. See High-
Level Expert Grp. on Artificial Intelligence, European Comm’n, Ethics Guidelines for 
Trustworthy AI 21–22 (2019),  https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id= 
60419 [ https://perma. cc/7BKM-VDHP]. 
 29. As Hoffman and Podgurski put it: 
Confounding bias is a systematic error that occurs because there exists a 
common cause of the treatment/exposure variable and the outcome 
variable. For example, socioeconomic factors may be confounders be-
cause low income may cause individuals to choose sub-optimal, inexpen-
sive treatments and may also separately lead to deteriorated health be-
cause of stress or poor nutrition. A failure to account for socioeconomic 
status may thus skew study results. 
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 58 (footnote omitted). 
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successful transplant.30 The main problem with the example Khullar 
gives is that poverty itself is not a direct cause of the bad medical out-
comes.31 Rather, there are intervening causes. AI scholars have long ad-
dressed this problem. For example, Judea Pearl and Dana MacKenzie 
have insisted that a knowledge of causation—how an alleged effect gen-
erates a cause—is crucial to genuine advances in AI.32 
Moreover, even if it turns out that, ceteris paribus, poorer individuals 
simply do not do as well as others after transplants (surviving a shorter 
period of time, or with worse comorbidities and sequelae of the proce-
dure), that fact alone would not dictate any particular change in their 
priority for organ transplantation. Society may decide that a thorough-
going equality of access is the proper baseline for access to scarce organs, 
even if such allocation rules fail to maximize quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) or similar outcome metrics.33 
Hoffman and Podgurski also point out the inadequacies of some 
data, especially those captured on the fly by doctors and nurses who al-
ready have more than enough to do on their shifts.34 Electronic health 
record (EHR) systems may use different abbreviations: “Different systems 
may use different terminology to mean the same thing or the same termi-
nology to mean different things. For example, the abbreviation ‘MS’ can 
mean ‘mitral stenosis,’ ‘multiple sclerosis,’ ‘morphine sulfate,’ or 
‘magnesium sulfate.’”35 At present, the job of correcting (or throwing 
out) bad data, as well as related tasks of semantic harmonization and 
standardization, is often treated as secondary or menial.36 But at a certain 
level of prevalence, such errors could be disastrous. Researchers must 
take into account measurement biases, which “are generated by errors in 
measurement and data collection resulting from faulty equipment or 
software or from human error.”37 Data are always socially shaped.38 To 
                                                                                                                           
 30. See, e.g., Mary Simmerling, Beyond Scarcity: Poverty as a Contraindication for 
Organ Transplantation, 9 AMA J. Ethics 441, 442–44 (2007) (examining the financial 
burdens of post-transplant medications on the uninsured, the underinsured, and the 
poor). 
 31. See Khullar, supra note 28. 
 32. Pearl & MacKenzie, supra note 28, at 1–21. See generally Judea Pearl, Causal 
Inference in Statistics: An Overview, 3 Stat. Surv. 96 (2009) (discussing advances in statisti-
cal research that facilitate solving causal questions). 
 33. See Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and 
Necessary Burdens 22, 35–38 (1992) (discussing diverse normative bases for allocation 
decisions). 
 34. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 57. 
 35. Id. at 57. 
 36. See Lilly Irani, Justice for “Data Janitors,” Pub. Books (Jan. 15, 2015), 
 https://www.publicbooks.org/justice-for-data-janitors/ [https://perma.cc/JLY6-Y6URt] 
(describing the work done by human “data janitors” to parse information that artificial 
intelligence systems are not capable of differentiating). 
 37. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 26, at 58. 
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avoid troubling outcomes downstream, law must incentivize health care 
providers to ensure that data providers take the time and effort necessary 
to address well-known biases and shortcomings of data. 
In the case of automobiles, similar problems may emerge. There 
may be certain individuals that a collision avoidance detection system is 
less likely to identify as persons.39 Operators of autonomous cars may de-
ploy humans as a backup, to ensure the data a car is reacting to are accu-
rate, but even such a failsafe may itself be blameworthy if improperly ap-
plied. Human–computer interaction research has revealed that such 
“backup” roles are notoriously difficult to perform well, particularly in 
contexts in which attention is only required rarely and sporadically.40 
B. Inappropriate Data 
While earlier versions of AI, such as expert systems, were primarily 
rules based, data drives modern machine learning.41 As recent contro-
versies over predictive policing have shown, data can be unfairly unrepre-
sentative: If minority neighborhoods have been overpoliced in the past, 
more crime will have been found in them than would be found in other 
neighborhoods, ceteris paribus.42 Similarly, a firm that primarily hired 
                                                                                                                           
 38. See Lisa Gitelman & Virginia Jackson, Introduction, in “Raw Data” Is an 
Oxymoron 1, 2–6 (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013) (arguing that data are not inherently neutral 
but rather constructed and gathered in ways that are shaped by academic disciplines). See 
generally Taylor M. Cruz, The Making of a Population: Challenges, Implications, and 
Consequences of the Quantification of Social Difference, 174 Soc. Sci. & Med. 79 (2017) 
(discussing how the process of gathering population data imposes implicit categorical 
assumptions on a heterogenous population). 
 39. Benjamin Wilson, Judy Hoffman & Jamie Morgenstern, Predictive Inequity in Object 
Detection, arXiv (Feb. 21, 2019),  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.11097.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (identifying potential for object detection technology to fail to de-
tect people with darker skin tones). 
 40. See, e.g., David A. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves 201–02 (2015) (describing the 
difficulties and failures associated with human operators serving as a backup in the event 
of failures by AI-driven systems such as autonomous vehicles); Madeleine Clare Elish, 
Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction, 5 Engaging Sci., 
Tech., & Soc’y 40, 52–55 (2019) (noting the difficulty of distributing responsibility and 
agency between a self-driving car and its safety driver). 
 41. Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm 7 (2015). 
 42. See Angèle Cristin, Predictive Algorithms and Criminal Sentencing, in The 
Decisionist Imagination: Sovereignty, Social Science, and Democracy in the 20th Century 
272, 279–80 (2019) (“When predictive algorithms identify ‘hot spot’ crime zones (usually 
low-income African American neighborhoods), policemen are more likely to patrol in 
these neighborhoods and arrest people who will later be convicted. . . . This data will later 
be entered into the algorithm, thus producing a feedback loop.”). 
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male managers in the past may end up developing AI hiring mechanisms 
that correlate success with gender, as opposed to actual job performance.43 
Activists and authors are now exposing numerous examples of prob-
lematic data sets. For example, Caroline Criado Perez has explained how 
data sets often do not adequately represent women, with very troubling 
results.44 In too much medical research and pedagogy, for instance, male-
ness is assumed as a default. As Perez asks, “There are still vast medical 
gender data gaps to be filled in, but the past twenty years have demon-
strably proven that women are not just smaller men: male and female 
bodies differ down to a cellular level. So why aren’t we teaching this?”45 
Data may also be illegally obtained and therefore inappropriate for 
use. For example, an AI hiring algorithm might incorporate breached 
medical records that help it predict an applicant’s health issues. Even if 
such health issues would impair the applicant’s job performance, this 
data use is suspect. Thanks to trade secrecy, it may be difficult to detect 
or litigate.46 Nevertheless, litigants are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated at unearthing the true bases of decisionmaking, and no firm 
should be entitled to hide the use of illegally obtained data.47 
                                                                                                                           
 43. See, e.g., Gideon Mann & Cathy O’Neil, Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral, 
Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral 
[https://perma.cc/BA6V-492D] (“When humans build algorithmic screening software, 
they may unintentionally determine which applicants will be selected or rejected based on 
outdated information—going back to a time when there were fewer women in the work-
force, for example—leading to a legally and morally unacceptable result.”); see also 
Miranda Bogen & Aaron Reike, Upturn, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, 
Equity, and Bias 8–9 (2018),  https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring-
algorithms/files/Upturn%20–%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20of% 
20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T6U-4QL4] 
(describing examples of potential bias in predictive hiring tools). 
 44. See generally Caroline Criado Perez, Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World 
Designed for Men (2019) (examining the “gender data gap”). 
 45. Id. at 199. 
 46. See Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 104–05) (footnote omitted), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3409578 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“At their core, these automated systems 
often implicate central issues of due process, criminal (and civil) justice, and equal protec-
tion. Yet, because their inner workings are often protected as trade secrets, they can remain 
entirely free from public scrutiny.”); Frank Pasquale, Digital Star Chamber, Aeon (Aug. 18, 
2015), https://aeon.co/essays/judge-jury-and-executioner-the-unaccountable-algorithm 
[https://perma.cc/56VN-M3AT] (“Protected by trade secrecy, many algorithms remain 
impenetrable to outside observers.”). 
 47. Concededly, the Supreme Court has offered a First Amendment imprimatur for 
reuse of illegally obtained information in some contexts. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 
U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (finding the First Amendment protects “speech that discloses the 
contents of an illegally intercepted communication”). However, that defense is condi-
tioned on a “public interest” finding, id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring), and secret 
categorization or ranking of applicants should not qualify. See Frank Pasquale, Reforming 
the Law of Reputation, 47 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 515, 529–30 (2015) (discussing the limits of 
Bartnicki). 
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Finally, certain inferences can become data that are extraordinarily 
suspect.48 Consider, for instance, the rise of efforts to correlate persons’ 
facial features and voices with illness, risk, or aptitude. Machine learning 
researchers have stirred controversy by claiming that our faces may reveal 
our sexual orientation and intelligence.49 Using a database of prisoners’ 
faces, some have even developed stereotypes of criminal features, repris-
ing long-discredited physiognomy and phrenology.50 A firm has claimed 
that it can deploy facial recognition to spot pedophiles and terrorists.51 
These inferences are deeply troubling. When such methods of pattern 
recognition are used to classify persons, they overstep a fundamental 
boundary between objective analysis and moral judgment. And when 
such moral judgments are made, persons categorized by the judgements 
deserve a chance to understand and contest them. 
When a data set is not representative of the group it is used to clas-
sify, any results based on it should be clearly qualified. For example, a 
machine learning classifier may properly be said to succeed in classifying 
some percentage of faces in its data set in certain ways. But it should not 
be deployed as a potential classifier for all persons unless and until we 
have some sense of how the training set maps to the full set of persons it 
ostensibly classifies. As Dan McQuillan warns, machine learning often 
makes powerful predictions, “prompting comparisons with science. But 
rather than being universal and objective, it produces knowledge that is 
irrevocably entangled with specific computational mechanisms and the 
data used for training.”52 Both lawmakers and policymakers should hold 
users of such data sets responsible for making predictable errors based 
                                                                                                                           
 48. For a fuller account of the problem of troubling or inappropriate inferences, see 
Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data 
Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 494, 499−505 
(2019). 
 49. See, e.g., Sam Levin, Face-Reading AI Will Be Able to Detect Your Politics and 
IQ, Professor Says, Guardian (Sept. 12, 2017),  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2017/sep/12/artificial-intelligence-face-recognition-michal-kosinski [https://perma.cc/ 
X4HD-KNAK]. 
 50. Sam Biddle, Troubling Study Says Artificial Intelligence Can Predict Who Will Be 
Criminals Based on Facial Features, The Intercept (Nov. 18, 2016),  https://theintercept.com/ 
2016/11/18/troubling-study-says-artificial-intelligence-can-predict-who-will-be-criminals-based-
on-facial-features/ [https://perma.cc/X3SN-QAEU]. It was later suggested that the sources of 
images used for the study may have been a key factor explaining its results. @davidjayharris, 
Twitter (Mar. 7, 2019),  https://twitter.com/davidjayharris/status/1103636069180993537 
[https://perma.cc/AKD5-TGPT]. 
 51. Matt McFarland, Terrorist or Pedophile? This Start-Up Says It Can Out Secrets 
by Analyzing Faces, Wash. Post (May 24, 2016),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
innovations/wp/2016/05/24/terrorist-or-pedophile-this-start-up-says-it-can-out-secrets-by-
analyzing-faces/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 52. Dan McQuillan, People’s Councils for Ethical Machine Learning, Soc. Media + 
Soc’y, Apr.–June 2018, at 1, 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118768303 [https:// 
perma.cc/9CS7-4AAK]. 
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on defective data sets, particularly if they fail to disclose the limitations of 
the data used. 
II. COMPLEMENTARY TORT AND REGULATORY REGIMES 
Tort law has evolved to handle the changing risks and affordances of 
new technologies.53 However, judges alone cannot adequately respond to 
the new challenges posed by AI. Objective sources of information on best 
practices in data science are necessary as well. Expert agencies are 
particularly well positioned to analyze and articulate emerging industry 
standards, which should inform judicial determinations of standards of 
care. This Part describes emerging doctrinal and regulatory approaches 
that suggest data-driven duties for the developers of artificial intelligence. 
This type of data stewardship serves two purposes: ex ante, to ensure that 
the training data for machine learning adequately reflects the domain it 
governs or affects, and ex post, to detect anomalies and remedy them 
before they cause great harm.54 Developing and maintaining these duties 
will be crucial to promoting just and humane advances in AI. 
As Professors Dan Dobbs, Paul Hayden, and Ellen Bublick explain, 
“A tort is conduct that constitutes a legal wrong and causes harm for 
which courts will impose civil liability.”55 Negligence, vicarious liability, 
strict liability, and product liability regimes all may be relevant to future 
torts attributable to AI.56 In the realm of negligence, the plaintiff gener-
ally must prove that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury, owed a 
duty of care to the plaintiff, and breached that duty.57 There are also di-
verse vicarious liability doctrines, each hinging on factors that include 
the degree of control an entity has over the direct cause of harm.58 As 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Donald G. Gifford, Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam 
Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation, 11 J. Tort L. 71, 143 
(2018). 
 54. Cf. Kristin Madison, Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1605, 
1607–09 (2014) (arguing that regulators, as data stewards, bear a duty to serve as both an 
aggregator and editor of big health care data in order to ensure both the integrity of data 
collection and informed, continuous evaluation of regulation). 
 55. Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen Bublick, Hornbook on Torts 3 (2d ed. 
2016). This basic tort definition is consistent even in civil law countries around the 
world. See, e.g., Principles of European Tort Law: Text and Commentary tit. 1, art. 1:101 
(Eur. Grp. on Tort Law 2005) (“Basic Norm (1) A person to whom damage to another is 
legally attributed is liable to compensate that damage.”); Tort Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce of China (Dec. 26, 2009), 
 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201312/2013
1200432451.shtml [https://perma.cc/5LMK-YLDC] (“Those who infringe on civil rights 
and interests shall be subject to tort liability according to this Law.”). 
 56. For a useful typology of torts, see the table of contents of Dobbs et al., supra note 
55, at xv–xxxi. 
 57. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 269 (2000). 
 58. Harry Shulman, Fleming James Jr., Oscar S. Gray & Donald G. Gifford, Law of 
Torts: Cases and Materials 112–30 (5th ed. 2010). 
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services become more complex, one of the most promising develop-
ments in tort law is corporate liability for failure to maintain adequate 
safety standards. 
For example, in one of the leading cases in medical corporate liabil-
ity, Thompson v. Nason Hospital, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not 
allow the responsibility for a bad outcome to dissolve into a mist of 
contractual relationships among a hospital, its staff, doctors, and the 
manufacturers of devices that its doctors and staff used.59 Rather, the 
Thompson court articulated a general duty of a hospital “to ensure the 
patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital.”60 The court went on 
to articulate four nonexhaustive dimensions of this general duty to pro-
tect safety and well-being: 
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and 
adequate facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and re-
tain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons 
who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and (4) 
a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and poli-
cies to ensure quality care for the patients.61 
This standard of corporate negligence has much to offer outside of 
the healthcare setting. One classic theoretical foundation of health law as 
a distinctive field is the great difference between ordinary consumer mar-
kets, on the one hand, and the healthcare field, where information asym-
metries and power differentials routinely arise between patients and 
healthcare providers, on the other.62 The rise of software and cyber-physical 
                                                                                                                           
 59. 591 A.2d 703, 709 (Pa. 1991). 
 60. Id. at 707. 
 61. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. As Donald Cohodes argues, medical care can be differentiated from “most other 
products” in six general ways: 
1. Demand for health. Medical care services are not purchased from any 
desire for such services in themselves . . . [but instead are] derived from 
the “demand” for good health. 
2. Medical care and health. Medical care is only one determinant of health 
status, and for most people at most times it is not even a very important 
determinant. . . . 
3. Risk. The need for medical care is unpredictable, requiring expendi-
tures that are irregular and of uncertain magnitude. 
4. Immediacy. The need for medical care is often immediate, allowing lit-
tle time for shopping around and seeking advice or alternatives. 
5. Lack of Information. Consumers are usually ignorant of their medical 
care needs. They cannot possibly obtain the knowledge and training to 
diagnose their own medical care needs . . . . 
6. Uncertainty. Physicians, though highly trained and better able to diag-
nose needs and prescribed treatment, also are often uncertain about the 
appropriate services to provide. 
Donald R. Cohodes, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the 
Regulation/Competition Dialogue, 7 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 54, 56 (1982). 
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systems portends a similar increase in complexity, power differentials, 
and information asymmetry reminiscent of the highly scientific and 
professionalized medical milieu.63 Doctrines and approaches developed 
in the medical setting have already been proposed for other aspects of 
data governance. For example, health privacy law can serve as a model 
for the regulation of other data.64 Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain have 
proposed that a law of fiduciary duties, itself heavily reliant on the model 
of doctors’ duties to patients, should bind large technology firms with 
respect to their treatment of data collected from users.65 
Thompson has been cited many times, and its factors helpfully articu-
late theories of liability.66 An elaboration of the corporate negligence 
standard in a complex environment can illuminate the roles and respon-
sibilities of the developers of artificial intelligence. For example, the first 
duty (to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe facilities and 
equipment) suggests a similar obligation to exercise due care in the 
selection of sources of data. Thompson also reflects in law the conclusions 
of a larger quality-improvement movement: that it is less important to 
find particular persons to blame in the case of accidents, than to identify 
malfunctioning sociotechnical systems of human–computer interaction.67 
The third Thompson factor, regarding adequate supervision, also 
raises important questions in the context of automation developed in 
corporate labs and its testing outside of controlled settings. Surveillance 
techniques are widespread and well-developed.68 Such technology could 
                                                                                                                           
 63. On the rise of software in ordinary products, see Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, 
Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1672, 1676−79 
(2016); see also James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L.J. 1719, 
1723–24 (2005) (giving “four patterns [that] provide a general methodology for assessing 
the use of software in a given regulatory context”). 
 64. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control 
Money and Information 150–51 (2015) (discussing HIPAA standards for consent, security, 
and accounting of disclosures of health data as a model for other forms of data). 
 65. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 1183, 1221–25 (2016). But see Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of 
Information Fiduciaries, 133 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6–8), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that 
creating new fiduciary duties based on information custody is fundamentally incompatible 
with existing corporate law of fiduciary duties and therefore impossible to implement in 
the form proposed by Balkin and Zittrain). 
 66. As of March 15, 2019, Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), has 
been cited in 198 cases and 273 secondary sources on Westlaw Edge. 
 67. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1853 (1994) (describing the 
importance of system-level analysis in attribution of blame and prevention of future 
harms). 
 68. See, e.g., Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and Truck-
Driving Work, 31 Info. Soc’y 160, 160, 164 (2015) (describing how trucking firms have exten-
sively deployed telematics to monitor truck drivers with regard to performance and 
timekeeping); Steve Kolowich, Behind the Webcam’s Watchful Eye, Online Proctoring 
Takes Hold, Chron. Higher Educ. (Apr. 15, 2013),  https://www.chronicle.com/article/ 
2019] DATA-INFORMED DUTIES 1931 
 
help reduce bias in data collection and promote vigilance among those 
tasked with overseeing the deployment of AI in sensitive settings. On the 
other hand, privacy activists may raise concerns if the common law of tort 
promotes excessive surveillance of workers.69 Once again, the health care 
industry has been at the forefront, developing balanced frameworks for 
the inclusion of surveillance technology in workplaces in which human 
life is routinely at risk.70 
III. REGULATORY STANDARDS FOR DATA USE AND REPORTING 
If a large proportion of cases involving AI went to trial, reported 
opinions would serve as a prominent source of guidance for AI vendors 
and users concerned about safety and effectiveness. However, we can ex-
pect that here, as with data security, the prevalence of settlements of dis-
putes will frustrate such evolutionary clarification of duties.71 In this vac-
uum, regulators should play a vital role in setting (or at least informing) 
                                                                                                                           
Behind-the-Webcams-Watchful/138505 [https://perma.cc/CQ5T-2C74] (describing 
online proctors that watch students through a webcam to detect cheating); Natasha 
Singer, Online Test-Takers Feel Anti-Cheating Software’s Uneasy Glare, N.Y. Times (Apr. 5, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/technology/online-test-takers-feel-anti-cheat-
ing-softwares-uneasy-glare.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing software 
developed to detect cheating during online and computer exam taking). 
 69. See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Can They Do That?: Retaking Our Fundamental Rights in 
the Workplace 16–17 (2009) (describing an example of intrusive surveillance of workers); 
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 Calif. 
L. Rev. 735, 735–36, 772–73 (2017) (describing the trend of increased worker surveillance 
and exploring possible remedies to protect worker privacy). 
 70. See generally Clara Berridge, Jodi Halpern & Karen Levy, Cameras on Beds: The 
Ethics of Surveillance in Nursing Home Rooms, 10 AJOB Empirical Bioethics 55 (2019) 
(examining survey data on the use of “family-provided cameras” in nursing homes and 
their legal and ethical implications); Karen Levy, Lauren Kilgour & Clara Berridge, 
Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of Nursing Home Monitoring Laws, 
26 Elder L.J. 323, 326–27 (2019) (comparing “state laws and regulations governing resi-
dent-room cameras in nursing homes . . . focus[ing] on how such rules approach and 
balance the privacy concerns of the multiple relations involved in such contexts, and how 
legal protections do—and do not—address relationship-specific interests”). 
 71. See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1135, 1144 
(2019) (“There are numerous lawsuits about data security, which raise claims under tort, 
contract, or consumer protection law, among other theories. Courts considering these 
cases offer hardly any insight into the content of the duty of data security, however, because 
they almost never reach the merits.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against 
Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075, 1078–85 (1984) (complaining of the problems caused 
by this avoidance). Instead, in the data security context, the Federal Trade Commission 
has taken the lead. See Woodrow Hartzog and Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 585–86 (2014) (“Despite over fifteen 
years of FTC enforcement, there are hardly any judicial decisions to show for it. The cases 
have nearly all resulted in settlement agreements. . . . Thus, in practice, FTC privacy 
jurisprudence has become the broadest and most influential regulating force on infor-
mation privacy in the United States . . . .”). 
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standards.72 Though the current Congress is unlikely to establish a new 
agency, existing statutory authorities already grant extant agencies the 
power to gather, analyze, and disseminate data that would aid courts’ 
assessments of the proper standard of care in disputes related to AI-in-
formed and AI-performed services.73 Some of these agencies have also 
established standards that have informed tort cases in data-related fields, 
such as privacy law.74 
A. Ensuring the Integrity of Inputs 
One purpose of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act’s (HIPAA) security requirements is to protect data from hackers or 
other corrupting influences.75 A logical extension of this duty is for agen-
cies to set standards for AI vendors and users to verify the quality and 
accuracy of the data they use.76 These standards may start at an elemen-
tary level. For example, HIPAA best practices dictate that a covered entity 
both record any source of data it receives and record its transfer of data 
to other covered entities or business associates.77 Those recipients of data 
must in turn do the same.78 This creates a set of links that makes it easier 
to trace and then minimize the impact of inaccurate, unrepresentative, 
                                                                                                                           
 72. For a general account of the government role in promoting standardized data, 
see generally Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326377 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 73. See Andrew F. Popper, Gwendolyn M. McKee, Anthony E. Varona, Philip J. 
Harter, Mark C. Niles & Frank Pasquale, Administrative Law: A Contemporary Approach 
1067–134 (3d ed. 2016) (describing the power, and the limits of such power, of U.S. agen-
cies to demand information). 
 74. See infra sections III.A–.B. 
 75. See Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance of 
Information Policy, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 95, 105–09 (2014) (describing the range 
of security measures prescribed by HIPAA). 
 76. See, e.g., Meredith Whittaker, Kate Crawford, Roel Dobbe, Genevieve Fried, 
Elizabeth Kaziunas, Varoon Mathur, Sarah Myers West, Rashida Richardson, Jason 
Schultz & Oscar Schwartz, AI Now Report 2018, at 4–7 (2018),  https://ainowinstitute.org/ 
AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J3T-TCTR] (discussing the importance of 
sectoral regulation); cf. Frank Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health 
Care, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1661, 1668−69, 1671−73, 1692 (2014) (describing a broad array of pub-
lic and private actors that have cooperated in highly technical areas to promote data quality 
and interoperability in the health care industry). 
 77. Bill Becker, HIPAA Compliance Best Practices: Questions and Answers to Improve 
Security and Avoid Penalties, HIPAA J. (May 16, 2017),  https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-
compliance-best-practices-8809/ [https://perma.cc/GZZ5-HM4L]; Office for Civil Rights, How 
Are Covered Entities Expected to Determine What Is the Minimum Necessary Information that 
Can Be Used, Disclosed, or Requested for a Particular Purpose?, HHS: Health Info. Privacy 
(Dec. 19, 2002),  https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/207/how-are-covered-enti-
ties-to-determine-what-is-minimum-necessary/index.html [https://perma.cc/R788-UZRW] 
(last updated Mar. 14, 2006). 
 78. See Becker, supra note 77 (discussing best practices for improving data security); 
Office for Civil Rights, supra note 77 (setting out requirements for minimum data sharing). 
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or otherwise compromised data.79 Similar standards should inform the 
stewardship of data used for machine learning and AI. Federal standards 
for data protection may, in turn, become part of the standard of care for 
torts like breach of medical confidentiality.80 
For a concrete example of why such practices matter, consider how 
voice recognition software may be more or less accurate with respect to 
persons with different voices or accents.81 As of 2020, databases may have 
a certain level of inclusiveness;82 by 2025, this is likely to have improved 
markedly.83 An AI vendor using the 2020 database in 2025 for mission-
critical applications may rightly be faulted for failing to update in light of 
new knowledge about the limitations of the database. But we would not 
even know where to look for such a problem if the source of the firm’s 
data was not recorded adequately.84 
                                                                                                                           
 79. See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain Link Confidentiality, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 657, 677 (2012) 
(“The HIPAA Privacy Rules provide that, although only covered entities such as healthcare 
providers are bound to confidentiality, these entities may not disclose information to their 
business associates without executing a written contract that places the business associate 
under the same confidentiality requirements as the healthcare providers.”). These protec-
tions have been strengthened even further by the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) (and the HIPAA Omnibus Rule of 2013), 
which impose statutory and regulatory duties on business associates and even their down-
stream contractors. See Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy 
in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 595, 609–15 
(2014) (describing these duties). 
 80. See Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus 
Jost, Robert L. Schwartz, Brietta R. Clark, Erin C. Fuse Brown, Robert Gatter, Jaime S. King 
& Elizabeth Pendo, Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems 201 (8th ed. 2018) (noting 
that courts have held that “despite the absence of a private right of action under HIPAA, it 
can inform the applicable standard of care in common law tort cases”); see also Bonney v. 
Stephens Mem’l Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 128 (Me. 2011) (“HIPAA standards, like state laws 
and professional codes of conduct, may be admissible to establish the standard of care 
associated with a state tort claim . . . .”); Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 253 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2006) (describing HIPAA “providing evidence of the duty of care owed . . . with re-
gards to the privacy of plaintiff’s medical records”). But see Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d 
586 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt a negligence per se standard); Sheldon v. 
Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (same). 
 81. See Sonia Paul, Voice Is the Next Big Platform, Unless You Have an Accent, 
WIRED (Mar. 20, 2017),  https://www.wired.com/2017/03/voice-is-the-next-big-platform-
unless-you-have-an-accent/ [https://perma.cc/78TL-PSC9] (reporting on the difficulties 
associated with creating software that recognizes different accents). 
 82. See id. (reporting tech companies’ efforts to improve the inclusiveness of their 
accent data); Kyle Wiggers, These Companies Are Shrinking the Voice Recognition 
‘Accent Gap,’ Venture Beat (Aug. 11, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/08/11/using-
ai-and-big-data-to-address-the-accent-gap-in-voice-recognition-systems/ [https://perma.cc/ 
F96Z-9FH4] (same). 
 83. See Paul, supra note 81; Wiggers, supra note 82. 
 84. This is not a mere hypothetical; I recently had to take to Twitter to learn where 
the voices for a Google Assistant feature (Duplex) came from. The source was not clearly 
labeled on the corporate website trumpeting the feature. 
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Such standards will be resisted. AI vendors will likely push for an-
other approach, simply disclosing potential problems with their data in 
advance in disclaimers.85 Perhaps it is the responsibility of the person us-
ing the AI, rather than the vendor of AI, to correct for error-prone data-
sets. However, courts may also find ample precedent for holding vendors 
responsible. For example, in lawsuits over food poisoning, consumers’ 
“reasonable expectation” of purity and appropriateness of ingredients 
has been recognized.86 
Some AI-driven devices may also need to be subjected to the certifi-
cation and testing now applied (albeit minimally) to electronic health 
records.87 Thanks to the HITECH Act of 2009, the Department of Health 
and Human Services must assure that EHRs meet basic functionality re-
quirements.88 Failures of EHR vendors to comply with federal health 
standards have already led to litigation.89 Given the False Claims Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
 85. For entertaining examples of the rhetoric one can expect, see Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, Denialists’ Deck of Cards: An Illustrated Taxonomy of Rhetoric Used to 
Frustrate Consumer Protection Efforts (Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=962462 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (illustrating “a taxonomy of 
arguments used in denialism” by using “a deck of playing cards to make it more 
interesting and to emphasize that denialists are engaged in a predictable game to ‘do little 
and delay.’”). 
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(FCA) role in assuring that healthcare providers are treating patients 
with valid and effective forms of care, this form of liability should be a 
bellwether specifically for AI vendors contracting with governmental 
authorities. Consumer protection authorities should also take note. 
B. Ensuring the Transparency of Outputs 
Health regulators have long considered data stewardship a critical 
role under their statutory mandate.90 When the federal government be-
gan funding EHRs in earnest in 2011, it not only demanded certain basic 
recordkeeping but also set providers on an ambitious path toward 
“meaningful use” of information technology—including potentially AI-
driven tools like clinical decision support.91 In 2015, Congress promoted 
interoperability in the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA).92 This drive for interoperability continues to this day, as the 
Office for the National Coordinator of Health Information Technology 
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have recently an-
nounced rulemakings designed to help promote data liquidity.93 
One key rationale for interoperability is supporting the massive 
disclosure and reporting requirements mandated pursuant to healthcare 
finance reforms (covering Advanced Payment Models (APMs) such as 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), as well as readmissions penal-
ties and bundled payments).94 It may be very difficult for networks like 
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ACOs to accurately report on quality standards without a common infra-
structure of EHRs that can aggregate data on key performance indicators 
and benchmarks.95 A common indicator of nosocomial infection, for in-
stance, may be critical to ensuring the integrity of performance assessment. 
AI applications are already playing a role in promoting health-re-
lated interventions and should be subject to similar performance assess-
ments. For example, as Natasha Singer has reported, Facebook has de-
ployed an algorithm to flag users that may be so suicidal that police 
should be called by Facebook employees to intervene.96 Mason Marks has 
documented numerous other examples of “social suicide prediction” 
programs, which use machine learning to generate risk scores for indi-
viduals.97 There are long-term risks to privacy and autonomy that such 
scores could create—for example, if unregulated and shared beyond 
their source, they may affect the marketing a person experiences, or even 
job or insurance opportunities.98 
They also raise important concerns about immediate risks to safety 
caused by false positives. What are the stigmatic concerns raised by being 
falsely accused of extreme suicidality, or of a suicide attempt? What do 
first responders think of the interventions they have been prompted to 
carry out? Ensuring that there are standard ways of reporting positive 
and negative interventions here could help policymakers better deter-
mine which AI to fund in this critical area. It could also nip in the bud 
problematic interventions, like the Samaritans’ Radar App, which shut 
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down its simple program for automated detection of suicidality after pub-
lic complaints.99 
CONCLUSION 
Futurists envision AI programs that effectively act of their own ac-
cord, without direction or control by their developers (or any other per-
son). Such entities could be quite dangerous.100 However, advocates for 
such AI believe that law should effectively step out of the way of its 
development. How, the question goes, can the creators or owners of such 
general-purpose technology anticipate all the potential legal problems 
their AI might generate or encounter? No one wants to hold Microsoft 
responsible for ransom notes written with MSWord—it is a blank slate. 
Nor are parents responsible for the crimes of their children—they are 
independent entities. 
Leading developers of AI, at present, benefit from both the “blank 
slate” and “independent entity” intuitions of nonresponsibility for their 
creations. But neither should immunize such firms, given a decade of 
research on algorithmic accountability. As Jack Balkin has observed, we 
all now know that algorithms can “(a) construct identity and reputation 
through (b) classification and risk assessment, creating the opportunity 
for (c) discrimination, normalization, and manipulation, without (d) 
adequate transparency, accountability, monitoring, or due process.”101 
Moreover, we are well aware of their ability to malfunction, dating back at 
least to the Therac-25 debacle of the 1980s.102 These factors all counsel in 
favor of discouraging the development of any AI whose actions are not 
directly attributable to a person or persons that can be held responsible 
for them.103 
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However appealing dreams of artificial general intelligence may be, 
the dominant version of AI now prevalent in commerce and government 
is only a few steps removed from algorithmic systems we are all now famil-
iar with. For example, “AI hiring” based on voice parsing is not a substi-
tute for a Director of Human Resources.104 Nor is it an all-purpose assess-
ment of character. Rather, it is a method of translating data (a voice) into 
an output (an assessment of likely success at a job) based on compu-
tational analysis of how past employees with similar voices have fared at 
the job. True, the concept of “similarity” here may have far more dimen-
sions than a simple linear relationship; contemporary machine learning 
is premised on advances in computational power that not only allow vari-
ous, granular hypotheses to be tested, but also combine potentially rele-
vant variables in myriad ways.105 However, the collection, analysis, and use 
of data is foundational to the process, and presents several opportunities 
for imposing duties on AI developers, given possibly inaccurate or 
inappropriate data. 
Advocates for legal technology (including legaltech, regtech, and 
fintech) have promoted a “duty of technological competence” for law-
yers.106 In many cases, an attorney cannot properly serve a client without 
knowing how to use certain databases or search engines. Nor can a law-
yer competently advise a modern business on a topic like document 
retention without a clear sense of how computers store data. Rules of 
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professional responsibility, as well as tort doctrines of legal malpractice,107 
enforce a duty of technological competence on many attorneys.108 
In numerous fields, there is a parallel duty for technology providers 
to have some basic understanding of the law as they serve their clients. A 
video hosting service in the United States, for example, needs to under-
stand the fundamentals of copyright law.109 Firms developing electronic 
health record software unaware of the requirements of HIPAA110 (and 
many other laws governing health privacy) cannot serve their clients well. 
In these cases, and many others, the onus is not simply on the buyer of 
the technology to vet what it is buying or leasing. Rather, principles of 
secondary liability effectively impose what might be called a duty of legal 
competence—of a basic understanding of what law requires—on 
technologists.111 Some popular understandings of artificial intelligence 
pose a threat to the duty of legal competence by mystifying the bases of 
decisions. However, law and policy can require basic safeguards be taken 
in its development, can standardize public reporting on its effectiveness 
and safety, and can impose liability on the developers of unsafe, biased, 
or otherwise defective AI. 
The promise of AI law and policy is to ensure that the owners and 
developers of algorithms are more accountable to the public.112 Without 
imposing legal duties on the developers of AI, there is little chance of 
ensuring accountable technological development in this field. By focus-
ing on data, the fundamental input for AI, both judges and policymakers 
can channel the development of AI to respect, rather than evade, core 
legal values. 
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